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What Can Be Done About A Disruptive Physician?  
A Legal Analysis 
 
Samuel D. Hodge, Jr.* 
 
House, a medical drama about an infectious disease 
specialist, entertained television audiences for years as the 
irascible and pill-popping physician solved medical mysteries 
with the zeal of a modern-day Sherlock Holmes while playing 
mind games with his coworkers. Uncanny intuition and 
eccentric thinking earned the physician great respect but his 
bullish behavior and antisocial tendencies were a distraction at 
the hospital.1 Not only did Dr. House clash with his fellow 
physicians but he also insulted patients, flouted hospital rules 
and caused great conflict with the hospital administrators.2 In 
fact, his actions often crossed the line into obnoxiousness and 
rage causing the hospital staff to tiptoe around his dysfunctional 
behavior.3 
In the real world, Dr. House would be labeled a “disruptive 
physician” and would be subjected to disciplinary action 
including the loss of his hospital privileges.  This article will 
explore the problems caused by being labeled a disruptive 
physician in a legal context with a focus on the peer review 
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1. House (TV Series), Wɪᴋɪᴘᴇᴅɪᴀ, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_ 
(TV_series), (last visited Sept. 14, 2019).  
2. Id.  
3. Bob Wachter, Gregory House, MD, RIP, HOSPITAL LEADER BLOG (May 
21, 2012), https://thehospitalleader.org/gregory-house-md-rip/. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
The practice of medicine is filled with stress from being 
involved in life and death decisions, to declining revenues while 
practicing in a heavily regulated environment.4  These facts have 
triggered the quick response by some physicians to use 
regulatory schemes to advance their own personal agendas and 
to protect personal interests.5  Unfortunately, these rules and 
regulations, which are not well understood by most medical 
professionals, have caused a great deal of animosity and 
frustration, leading some doctors to become “disruptive 
physicians.”6 
The troublesome physician causes untold medical, legal, 
and psychological problems in the workforce,7 and most health 
care managers are ill prepared to deal with these doctors.8  For 
 
4. Michael J. Grogan & Paul Knechtges, The Disruptive Physician: A 
Legal Perspective, 20 Aᴄᴀᴅ. Rᴀᴅɪᴏʟᴏɢʏ 9, 1069–73 (2013).  
5. Zachary L. Erwin, Analyzing the Disruptive Physician: How State and 
Federal Courts Should Handle Whistleblower Cases Brought by Disruptive 
Physicians, 44 Dᴜǫ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 275, 275 (2006). 
6. Id. at 276. 
7. Id.  
8. Eugene Fibuch & Jennifer J. Robertson, Bringing Value: Dealing Fairly 
With Disruptive Physicians, AM. ASS’N PHYSICIAN LEADERSHIP (Mar. 8, 2019), 
https://www.physicianleaders.org/news/bringing-value-dealing-fairly-
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/3
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example, disruptive physicians can lead to a hostile work 
environment, cause morale problems, increased litigation, 
compromised patient care, communication issues, and 
obstruction in the regular running of the organization.9  As noted 
by Alexander Vaccaro M.D., the President of the Rothman 
Institute, “There is no place in medicine for disruptive 
physicians and every study that has examined the issue has 
concluded that a disruptive doctor increases the chance of an 
adverse event.  In fact, these physicians have a higher 
complication rate and receive negative feedback in patient 
satisfaction surveys.”10  Addressing this conduct head-on is 
critical, but recognizing the proper course of remedial action can 
be a daunting task.11 
 
II. What is a Disruptive Physician? 
 
No single definition exits to describe a disruptive physician 
but a number of organizations and court decisions have 
addressed the issue.  Some medical professionals claim that they 
have an “instinctive understanding” of what represents 
disruptive behavior and do not need guidance.12  On the other 
hand, the Court in Gordon v. Lewistown defines a disruptive 
physician as one who is unruly, “contentious, threatening, 
unreachable, insulting and frequently litigious. He will not, or 
cannot, play by the rules, nor is he able to relate to or work well 
with others.”13  It is important to note, however, that a sole 
occurrence of troublesome behavior is inadequate to be labeled a 
disruptive physician and anticipating complete harmony in the 
workplace is unrealistic.  The tag should also not be used to 
 
disruptive-physicians. 
9. Erwin, supra note 5, at 275–76. 
10. Alexander Vaccaro, M.D., Ph.D, MBA, is an orthopedic surgeon and 
the President of Rothman Institute, one of the largest orthopedic practices in 
the country. He is also the Richard H. Rothman Professor and Chair in the 
Department of Orthopaedic Surgery, and a Professor of Neurosurgery at 
Thomas Jefferson University in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. His comments 
were obtained in a telephone interview conducted by the author on September 
20, 2019.  
11. Alicia Gallegos, Disruptive Physicians: Is This an HR or MEC Issue?, 
MDEDGE (Sept. 16, 2018), https://www.mdedge.com/internalmedicine/article 
/174921/businessmedicine/disruptive-physicians-hr-or-mec-issue. 
12. Grogan & Knechtges, supra note 4, at 2. 
13. Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 714 A.2d 539, 544 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998).  
3
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describe a doctor who has had a bad day or demonstrates an 
occasional outburst that is out of character.  Nor should the label 
apply to a physician who has quirks, tends to be disagreeable, or 
annoys others on the medical staff.14  Rather, the 
characterization should be reserved for those who show a 
pattern of seriously inappropriate conduct that is “deep-seated 
and habitual.”15  A single incident that is improper must still be 
addressed but the label “disruptive physician” is reserved for 
more sustained and inappropriate behaviors over a period of 
time.16 
 
III. The Problem 
 
As the sophistication and intricacies of medicine and 
managed health care increase, the need to work in a conducive 
atmosphere of cooperation intensifies.  Contemporaneously, the 
pressures, burdens, and distractions involving physicians 
correspondingly escalate. Because doctors occupy an esteemed 
position in society, inappropriate actions by these individuals 
become magnified and have a greater probability for 
disruption.17 
Acknowledged in the medical literature for more than a 
century,18 there is little evidence to demonstrate that the 
number of episodes of disruptive physicians has increased in 
recent years, but the problem has moved to the forefront of 
healthcare management.  Likewise, doctors who demonstrate 





14. Grogan & Knechtges, supra note 4, at 3; See also Mahmoodian v. 
United Hosp. Ctr., 404 S.E.2d 750 (W. Va. 1991).  
15. Norman T. Reynolds, Disruptive Physician Behavior: Use and Misuse 
of the Label, 98 J. MED. REG. 1, 10 (2012).  
16. Id. at 9–10. 
17. Brian J. Santin & Krista L. Kaups, The Disruptive Physician: 
Addressing the Issues, BULL. AM. COLL. SURGEONS (Feb. 1, 2015), 
http://bulletin.facs.org/2015/02/the-disruptive-physician-addressing-the-
issues/. 
18. Llewellyn E. Piper, Addressing the Phenomenon of Disruptive 
Physician Behavior, 22 HEALTH CARE MANAGER 335, 335–39 (2003).   
19. Santin & Kaups, supra note 17. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/3
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Most physicians and other health care workers have seen 
their contemporaries engage in disruptive conduct with co-
employees, patients, and other individuals.20  In fact, more than 
seventy percent of doctors surveyed indicate that disruptive 
conduct happens at least once a month at their workplace, and 
more than ten percent admit that such episodes occur on a daily 
basis.21 This disruptive behavior runs the gamut from cursing to 
the refusal to follow established procedures.22  Most responders 
expressed concern about the consequences of this inappropriate 
conduct on their practices, and nearly all are of the opinion that 
the disruptive physician affects patient care.  Surprisingly, 
twenty-six percent of doctors acknowledged that they have 
engaged in disruptive conduct at some point during their careers 
and the most proffered reasons for these inappropriate actions 
are “workload and learned behaviors.”23 
Demographically, nurses are the main victims of this 
unseemly conduct,24 and a number have left their jobs as a 
result.25  The greatest offenders are those with the highest stress 
level jobs, with surgeons being labeled the greatest culprits, 
followed by obstetricians/gynecologists, orthopedic doctors, and 
primary care physicians.26 Other specialists with less frequent 
episodes include cardiologists, anesthesiologists, 
ophthalmologists, cardiac/vascular surgeons, kidney specialists, 
radiologists, oncologists, and psychiatrists.27 
 
B. Conduct That Is Disruptive 
 
20. Id. 
21. Owen MacDonald, Disruptive Physician Behavior, QUANTIAMD 1, 2 
(May 15, 2011), http://www.quantiamd.com/q-qcp/Disruptive_Physician_ 
Behavior.pdf. 
22. Id. at 2. 
23. Id. 
24. Stephen Lazoritz, Don’t Tolerate Disruptive Physician Behavior, AM. 
NURSE TODAY (Apr. 11, 2011), https://www.americannursetoday.com/dont-
tolerate-disruptive-physician-behavior-2/. 
25. Charles P. Samenow et. al., ACME Course Aimed at Addressing 
Disruptive Physician Behavior, PHYSICIAN EXEC. 32 (Jan.–Feb. 2008), 
https://www.mc.vanderbilt.edu/root/pdfs/cph/Samenow.pdf.  
26. Alan H. Rosenstein et. al., Legal Entanglements in Dealing with 
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Inappropriate conduct takes many forms, with the highest 
level of encounters being degrading comments, insults, and 
yelling.  Other types of disruptive behavior are less obvious but 
no less concerning.  These include a physician’s refusal to 
cooperate with others and the inability to adhere to established 
protocols.  Conduct which occurs less frequently includes 
physician assaults, discriminatory behavior, incompetence, 
retaliation, spreading malicious rumors, throwing objects, and 
substance abuse.28  Female physicians are slightly less likely to 
engage in disruptive conduct as compared to their male 
counterparts.29 
It is believed that disruptive physicians direct their actions 
against those who are perceived as having a status below the 
doctor.  It is theorized that the hierarchical character of the 
medical profession has produced alphas who feel compelled to 
flaunt their status.  Therefore, it should come as no surprise that 
one study ascertained that fifty percent of the conflicts dealing 
with disruptive doctors involve coworkers with less professional 
clout.30 
Critics of this label maintain that being designated a 
disruptive physician has been applied improperly by hospital 
management to jettison unwanted competition and anti-
administration practices.  It is also asserted that the phrase 
“disruptive physician” is buried in the bylaws and left 
intentionally broad, subjective, and undefined so that health 
care executives can construe it anyway they wish.31  Therefore, 
it is critical that hospitals implement rules and regulations that 
will assist them in the handling of disruptive doctors while 
shielding physicians from bogus claims of disruptive conduct.32 
 
IV. Remedial Measures 
 
28. MacDonald, supra note 21, at 4–5. 
29. Id. at 5. 
30. Brian M. Peters, Disruptive or Targeted Physician?: Compliance 
Strategies, HOSP. & HEALTH SYS. INST., February 9, 2006, Am. Health Law. 
Ass’n, AHLA-Papers P0209-608 (citing David O. Weber, Poll Results: Doctors’ 
Disruptive Behavior Disturbs Physician Leaders, PHYSICIAN EXEC., Sept.–Oct. 
2004, at 6). 
31. Lawrence R. Huntoon, Abuse of the “Disruptive Physician” Clause, 9 
J. AM. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS 68, 68 (2004).   
32. Peters, supra note 30, at 4.  
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/3
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A. The American Medical Association 
 
The first remedial attempt by the medical profession 
occurred at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the AMA House of 
Delegates who adopted Resolution 9 (A-99) dealing with the 
disruptive physician.  The pronouncement requested the AMA 
to “identify and study behavior by physicians that is disruptive 
to high quality patient care.”33  The end result was the 
enactment of AMA Policy E-9.045 titled Physicians with 
Disruptive Behavior.  This rule of ethics labels disruptive 
behavior as personal conduct, whether verbal or physical, that 
negatively affects or that potentially may adversely impact 
patient care.  This inappropriate conduct is not limited to those 
actions that interfere with one’s ability to work with others on 
the health care team. Physician criticism, however, that is 
provided in good faith with the intent of improving patient care 
should not be classified as disruptive behavior.34 
The AMA also published a Model Medical Code of Conduct 
that can be used by health care facilities in drafting their 
bylaws.35  This Code defines disruptive behavior as “any abusive 
conduct including sexual or other forms of harassment, or other 
forms of verbal or nonverbal conduct that harms or intimidates 
others to the extent that the quality of care or patient safety 
likely would be compromised.”36  Inappropriate behavior is 
discouraged, but if such conduct persists, it will be transformed 
into disruptive behavior.  Examples include: 
 
belittling or berating patients or members of their 
care team, use of profanity or disrespectful 
 
33. Dudley M. Stewart, Jr., Physicians with Disruptive Behavior, Report 
of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, CEJA Report 3-1-09, AMERICAN 
MEDICAL ASS’N 1, 1 (2009), https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/ files 
/corp/media-browser/public/about-ama/councils/Council%20Reports/council-
on-ethics-and-judicial-affairs/i09-ceja-physicians-disruptive-behavior.pdf. 
34. Id. at 2 (citing AMA Opinion 9.045 – Physicians with Disruptive 
Behavior). 
35. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS’N, Model Medical Staff Code of Conduct 
(2012), 
https://www.slideshare.net/BarneyCohen/amamedicalstaffcodeofconduct (last 
visited Oct.4, 2019). 
36. Id. at 1. 
7
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language, inappropriate comments written in a 
patient’s chart, blatant failure to respond to a 
patient’s needs, deliberate lack of cooperation 
with members of the medical staff, the deliberate 
refusal to return calls, and use of intentionally 
demeaning language that negatively impacts 
patient care.37 
 
The Code goes on to note that complaints about a physician 
should be in writing and directed to the president of the medical 
staff.  A copy of the complaint, Code of Conduct, and bylaws 
should be given to the accused within thirty days.  In turn, the 
offending member shall have the opportunity to respond in 
writing.38 
 
B. The Joint Commission 
 
The Joint Commission, which is the accrediting agency for 
more than 22,000 health care organizations in the United 
States,39 published Standard LD.03.01.01.  This provision 
acknowledges that a disruptive physician engages in “behavior 
that intimidates others and affects morale or staff turnover[,] 
undermines a culture of safety and can be harmful to patient 
care.”40  As a result, the Joint Commission requires health care 
organizations to establish a code of conduct that defines 
behaviors that are “acceptable,” “disruptive,” and 
“inappropriate.”41 
This problem is so significant that the Joint Commission 
subsequently issued a Sentinel Event Alert which notes that 
intimidating and disruptive behaviors can lead to medical 
errors, poor patient satisfaction, increased cost of care, and 
 
37. Id. at 2–3. 
38. Id. at 5. 
39. About the Joint Commission, JOINT COMMISSION, https:// 
www.jointcommission.org/about_us/about_the_joint_commission_main.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2019). 
40. LD.03.01.01: Leaders Create and Maintain a Culture of Safety and 
Quality Throughout the Hospital, JOINT COMMISSION 1, 1 https:// 
medschool.ucla.edu/workfiles/Site-AcademicAffairs/Events/17.Joint-
Commission.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2019).  
41. Stewart, Jr., supra note 33, at 1–2.  
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/3
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avoidable adverse outcomes.42  In response to criticism that the 
term “disruptive behavior” is both ambiguous and inaccurate, 
the definition was changed to “behavior or behaviors that 
undermine a culture of safety.”43 
 
C. Federation of State Medical Boards 
 
The Federation of State Medical Boards recognized the need 
to issue guidance on the disruptive physician when it issued the 
2000 Report of the Special Committee on Professional Conduct 
and Ethics, as well as in the 2011 Policy on Physician 
Impairment.44  The Special Committee’s Report defines 
disruptive behavior as “personal interaction with physicians, 
hospital personnel, patients, family members, or others that 
interferes with patient care.”45  Furthermore, disruptive 
behavior is not a diagnosis but a descriptive label that impairs 
the ability of the healthcare team to operate effectively, thereby 
placing patients at risk.  More specifically, it identified several 
ways in which disruptive conduct interferes with the 
doctor/patient relationship: 
 
1. The physician’s inappropriate behaviors or emotional 
outbursts shift the physician’s focus from the patient, 
which can result in errors in clinical judgment and 
performance. 
 
2. Physician’s emotional outbursts or other inappropriate 
behavior can increase apprehension and anxiety of the 
physician’s patients as well as other patients who may 
witness such outbursts and inappropriate behavior. 
 
 
42. JOINT COMMISSION, Behaviors that Undermine a Culture of Safety 
(July 9, 2008), https://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/18/SEA_40.pdf.   
43. Joint Commission Changes Term “Disruptive Behavior” in the 
Standards, HCPRO (Nov. 10, 2011), https://www.hcpro.com/ACC-273165-
851/Joint-Commission-changes-term-disruptive-behavior-in-the-
standards.html. 
44. Reynolds, supra note 15, at 8. 
45. Federation of State Medical Boards, Report of the Special Committee 
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3. Decreased effectiveness of the entire health team.  
Peers, nurses, allied health professionals, and other 
members of the health care team may be intimidated and 
anxious, causing a loss of their clinical focus and 




4. Decrease in effective communications among the 
health care team.46 
 
The Report went on to note that disruptive behavior in 
doctors is frequently the result of underlying pathology such as: 
“(1) addiction (2) stress (3) psychiatric disorders (e.g., bipolar 
disorder) or (4) personality disorders (e.g., narcissism).”47  
Personality disorders seem to be the cause of most referrals for 
disruptive behavior which may be treated, without or concurrent 
with punitive action.48 
 
D. Response by the States 
 
States have also taken steps to curb unprofessional medical 
conduct.  For instance, New York lists a number of ways that 
individuals can engage in professional misconduct under its 
public health law including “willfully harassing, abusing, or 
intimidating a patient either physically or verbally.”49  The 
Texas Medical Association deems a health care professional who 
engages in conduct that leads to a breakdown in safety measures 
or acts in an intimidating manner towards a member of the 
medical staff to be engaged in disruptive behavior.50  
Pennsylvania enacted the Peer Review Protection Act which 
provides that one offering information to any review 
organization shall be granted immunity unless the information 
is not related to the functions of the review entity or if the 
 
46. Id. at 5–6. 
47. Id. at 6. 
48. Id. 
49. N.Y. Educ. § 6530(31) (McKinney 2008). 
50. Crystal Conde, Joint Commission Tries to Regulate Physicians’ 
Behavior, TEX. MED. (Dec. 2009), https://www.texmed.org/Template.aspx?id 
=8189. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/3
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materials provided are false and the individual knew or had 
reason to think the material was false.51 
Failure of the facility to implement remedial measure to 
deal with disruptive physicians can result in expensive 
litigation.  This is evidenced by a number of costly 
discrimination/harassment lawsuits against health care 
facilities as the result of the disruptive physician.52  For 
instance, Chopourian v. Mercy General Hospital involved a 
federal matter in which the jury awarded $168 million to a forty-
five-year-old physician’s assistant who claimed that she was 
tormented and harassed by the surgeons and medical staff.53  
The plaintiff testified that one harasser informed her, “you’ll 
give in to me” and a surgeon told her that “I’m horny” and 
slapped her buttocks.54  A “bullying surgeon” stuck her with a 
needle and another called her a “stupid chick” in the operating 
room.55 
 
V. Peer Review Immunity 
 
Interacting with disruptive physicians can be a time-
consuming and emotionally exhausting endeavor for both 
management and the organization.  Nevertheless, health care 
leaders have a duty to investigate and stop unprofessional 
conduct in the workplace.56  This requires the implementation of 
an organized approach such as educating the staff as to what 
constitutes improper behavior and to clearly identify the 
penalties for engaging in such conduct.57  For example, a code of 
conduct or bylaws should be created which applies to all 
members of the health care team.  These directives should define 
what constitutes appropriate and inappropriate behavior in 
 
51. 63 PA. STAT. and CONS. STAT. ANN. § 425.3(a) (West 2019). 
52. Alice Gosfield, 2013 Health Law Handbook, Section 11:2. Scope of the 
Problem, at *4. 
53. Eugene Lee, Largest Sexual Harassment Verdict in History - $168 
Million, CAL. LAB. & EMP. L., https://calaborlaw.com/largest-sexual-
harassment-verdict-in-history-168-million/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2019). See also 
Chopourian v. Catholic Healthcare West, No. CIV S–09–2972, 2012 WL 
1551728 (E.D. Cal. 2012). 
54. Lee, supra note 53. 
55. Gosfield, supra note 52, at *4. 
56. Fibuch & Robertson, supra note 8. 
57. Id.  
11
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clear and precise language and contain a well-defined due 
process clause with an appeal process.  In turn, each physician 
should be asked to read and sign the document indicating an 
understanding of the rules.58   
A number of hospitals publish these rules under the 
category of “professionalism,” and mandate that physicians 
exhibit a minimum level of acceptable behavior towards co-
workers and patients.  Any violation of the rules may act as 
support for starting disciplinary action to address the conduct.59  
While differences in language and procedures among health care 
facilities is expected, common elements, include: Clearly 
explained behaviors that are expected; The repercussions for 
deviation from these behaviors should be explained in detail; 
Penalties should be staggered according to the severity of the 
incident; Those who commit repeat violations will be treated 
more harshly; and Every incident must be reported and 
documented.60 
This plan of action helps foster a positive atmosphere within 
the organization and members of the team are put on notice as 
to what is expected of them in the workplace.61 
Discipline against a disruptive physician, however, can 
result in retaliation by the offender, especially if the doctor’s 
hospital privileges are suspended.62  A key event in this regard 
occurred in 1988 when the United States Supreme Court decided 
Patrick v. Burget.63  This matter involved whether Oregon law 
protected physicians against federal antitrust liability as the 
result of their serving on a peer-review committee.64 The facts 
reveal that the plaintiff declined an invitation by the defendants 
to join their surgical practice.65  Instead, the plaintiff opened his 
own clinic but experienced problems in his dealings with the 
defendants.66  The dispute escalated into a peer-review 
proceeding to terminate the plaintiff’s hospital privileges at the 
 
58. Id.  
59. Santin & Kaups, supra note 17, at 3. 
60. Id.  
61. Fibuch & Robertson, supra note 8.  
62. See Hein-Muniz v. Aiken Reg’l Med. Ctr., 905 F. Supp. 2d 729 (D.S.C. 
2012). 
63. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988). 
64. Id. at 95–96. 
65. Id. at 96. 
66. Id. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/3
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city’s only hospital on the ground that his care of patients was 
below the hospital’s standards.67 
The plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit claiming violations of the 
Sherman Act by the defendant’s charges and by their 
participating in the peer-review proceeding in order to reduce 
competition from the plaintiff rather than to improve patient 
care.68  The Supreme Court ruled that the state’s law failed to 
shield the defendants from liability for their activities on the 
hospital peer-review committee.69  This ruling prompted 
Congress to enact the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 
1986.70  The legislature found that the threat of money damages 
under Federal law unreasonably dissuaded doctors from serving 
on professional peer review committees.  Therefore, there is a 
national overriding interest to protect physicians who serve in 
this capacity.71 
This statute offers immunity under Federal and State laws 
to those on a peer review body who act in the reasonable belief 
that their action was in the furtherance of quality health care, 
and they act after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts even 
though their actions adversely impact the clinical privileges or 
professional society membership of a physician.72  This statute 
sets forth the specific requirements and standards for immunity 
and applies to disruptive physician cases.73  Only a good faith 
review qualifies for immunity, so whether the standards are 
followed by the peer review committee is very important to the 
final disposition of most disruptive physician cases and is the 
subject of much litigation.74 
It must be noted, however, that the Act only grants 
immunity to “professional review actions.”75  This is defined as 
an action or recommendation by the professional review body 
which is done during a review activity, that is premised on the 
competence or professional actions of a doctor, and which may 
 
67. Id. at 97. 
68. Id. at 97–98. 
69. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 105. 
70. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11101 
(2019). 
71. Id.  
72. Id. 
73. Erwin, supra note 5, at 281–80. 
74. Id. at 280. 
75. Gosfield, supra note 52, at *1. 
13
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adversely affect the clinical privileges of the physician.76 
 
VI. Court Action 
 
Being labeled a disruptive physician, especially if sanctions 
are imposed, can have serious professional implications 
including the loss of one’s hospital privileges.  In fact, it can have 
career ending repercussions.  State and federal agencies can also 
discipline a physician who is labeled disruptive if the offending 
conduct is determined to influence the quality of patient care or 
if it implies moral, ethical, or unprofessional deficiencies.77  
Unhappy patients can register a complaint with the health plan 
or managed health care firm triggering an investigation that can 
cause the loss of a physician’s affiliation with the plan or 
hospital.  Intimating and unprofessional conduct can also be 
reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank, thereby 
resulting in other investigations and charges against the 
physician who seeks a hospital affiliation or credentialing.78 
This data bank79 maintains a listing of actions taken by 
authorized organizations regarding health care practitioners, 
entities, providers, and suppliers who do not meet professional 
standards.  These adverse reports are permanently kept unless 
modified or removed by the entity that submitted them.80  In 
turn, the information can be used in rendering decisions dealing 
with licensure, employment, contracting, membership or clinical 
privileges, or when conducting investigations.  Under the 
appropriate circumstances, the information may even be 
obtained by plaintiff’s counsel.81  Therefore, it is not surprising 
that litigation involving being labeled a disruptive physician is 
 
76. Standards for Professional Review Actions, 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) 
(2019). 
77. Wᴇɪꜱꜱ, Zᴀʀᴇᴛᴛᴛ, Bʀᴏꜰᴍᴀɴ, Sᴏɴɴɪᴇɴᴋʟᴀʀ, & Lᴇᴠʏ, P.C., How the Title of 
Disruptive Physician Can Ruin Your Career and How to Avoid It, Firm News 




79. What You Must Report to the NPDB, Nᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Pʀᴀᴄᴛɪᴛɪᴏɴᴇʀ Dᴀᴛᴀ Bᴀꜱᴇ, 
https://www.npdb.hrsa.gov/hcorg/whatYouMustReportToTheDataBank.jsp 
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common.82 
A Westlaw search of the phrase “disruptive physician” 
references 1,566 federal and state cases.83  Not all of the cases, 
however, are relevant.  For instances, some deal with whether a 
physician’s disruptive conduct constitutes a mental condition,84 
or whether a fee shifting provision of a hospital contract is in 
violation of public policy.  Relevant cases deal with such issues 
as the removal of sanctions or the recovery of money for lost 
income, restraint of trade, or emotional harm.85  Overall, the 
applicable cases involve the failure of the health care provider to 
follow process, discrimination claims, retaliation, or intent to 
harm cases.86 
An analysis shows that the courts do not care about actual 
quality issues, and they will usually not question the opinion of 
the hospital’s management team or the peer review committee.87  
In fact, the courts tend to favor the medical organization88 on the 
basis of the granting of immunity under the Health Care Quality 
Improvement Act, affording deference when hospitals adhere to 
their bylaws or rules, or finding that disruptive behavior by itself 
is a proper justification to sanction a physician.89  This bias in 
 
82. Most disruptive physician cases are resolved without court 
intervention. Rosenstein, supra note 26, at 46. 
83. This Westlaw search was conducted on Oct. 9, 2019. 
84. See Neravetla v. Dep’t of Health, 394 P.3d 1028 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). 
85. See Sternberg v. Nanticoke Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 62 A.3d 1212 (Del. 
2013). 
86. Rosenstein, supra note 26, at 49.  
87. See Ross Zbar et. al., The Disruptive Physician: Righteous Maverick or 
Dangerous Pariah?, 124 PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 409 (2009). 
88. Id. 
89. Erwin, supra note 5, at 281.  See  Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val 
Verde Mem’l Hosp., 437 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 1971). As noted: 
 
No court should substitute its evaluation of such matters for 
that of the Hospital Board. It is the Board, not the court, 
which is charged with the responsibility of providing a 
competent staff of doctors. The Board has chosen to rely on 
the advice of its Medical Staff, and the court cannot surrogate 
for the Staff in executing this responsibility. Human lives are 
at stake, and the governing board must be given discretion in 
its selection so that it can have confidence in the competence 
and moral commitment of its staff. The evaluation of 
professional proficiency of doctors is best left to the 
specialized expertise of their peers, subject only to limited 
judicial surveillance. The court is charged with the narrow 
15
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favor of a hospital is partially based upon the court’s reluctance 
to interfere with a hospital’s decision to revoke, suspend, 
restrict, or to refuse to renew the clinical privileges of a medical 
staff member.  Court review is usually limited to making sure 
that there is substantial adherence with the facility’s bylaws 
concerning such a decision, and to ensuring that the bylaws 
provide rudimentary notice, a fair procedure, and an impartial 
tribunal.90  This analysis is buttressed by the AMA, which notes 
that most lawsuits attacking a peer review proceeding should be 
dismissed at the summary motion phase.  The litigation should 
only proceed when the physician has rebutted the presumption 
that the peer review process was reasonable and fair.91 
The following is a representation of some of the cases under 
various categories. 
 
A. Immunity under the Healthcare Quality Improvement Act 
(HCQIA) 
 
Courts started finding health care facilities responsible for 
the inappropriate conduct of their medical staff under a 
corporate negligence theory for hiring and supervision in the 
mid-1960’s.  The basis for this liability is that patients depend 
upon the hospital to guarantee the quality of care afforded at its 
 
responsibility of assuring that the qualifications imposed by 
the Board are reasonably related to the operation of the 
hospital and fairly administered. In short, so long as staff 
selections are administered with fairness, geared by a 
rationale compatible with hospital responsibility, and 
unencumbered with irrelevant considerations, a court should 
not interfere. 
 
Sosa, 437 F.2d at 177. 
90. Mahmoodian v. United Hospital Center, Inc., 404 S.E.2d 750, 755 (W. 
Va. 1991).  See also Shulman v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 222 F. Supp. 59, 64 (D.D.C. 
1963); Eidelson v. Archer, 645 P.2d 171, 175 (Alaska 1982); Gaenslen v. Bd. of 
Dir., 232 Cal. Rptr. 239, 241-42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Gianetti v. 
Norwalk Hosp., 557 A.2d 1249, 1254–56 (Conn. 1989); Adkins v. Sarah Bush 
Lincoln Health Center, 544 N.E.2d 733, 737–41 (Ill. 1989); Pepple v. Parkview 
Mem‘l Hosp., Inc., 536 N.E.2d 274, 276 (Ind. 1989); Porter Mem‘l Hosp. v. 
Malak, 484 N.E.2d 54, 61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); State ex rel. Willman v. St. 
Joseph Hosp., 684 S.W.2d 408, 411–12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Gotsis v. Lorain 
Cmty. Hosp., 345 N.E.2d 641 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974); Miller v. 
Indiana Hosp., 419 A.2d 1191, 1193–94, 1196 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980), appeal 
denied (Pa. Oct. 1, 1980). 
91. Grogan & Knechtges, supra note 4, at *3. 
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facility.92  To succeed on such a claim, however, the plaintiff 
must prove that the hospital knew or should have known of the 
doctor’s negligent conduct.93 
This potential liability has motivated a number of state 
legislatures to enact peer review laws.94  A peer review is the 
way by which healthcare management examines the quality of 
medical treatment provided by physicians under their charge.  
This undertaking has been approved by different states who 
have enacted statutes to protect the privacy of the materials 
created during the peer review process.95  Likewise, Congress 
appreciated the need for effective peer review, as well as a 
procedure to encourage doctors to participate.96  This lead to the 
enactment of the Immunity under the Healthcare Quality 
Improvement Act of 1986 (IHQIA) in which Congress bestowed 
qualified immunity from liability for peer review participation to 
doctors and dentists as well as establishing a national 
practitioner data bank to keep track of inept, incompetent, or 
unprofessional physicians.  The legislation also established 
procedural rules for due process, privilege restrictions, and 
reporting requirements.97 
HCQIA has generated much litigation by disgruntled 
physicians who wish to sue the peer review committee that 
disciplined them as well as the whistleblowers who reported the 
disruptive physician.  The seminal case is Meyers v. 
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation,98 and this opinion is 
frequently referenced in many subsequent decisions.99  The facts 
reveal that Dr. Meyers filed a lawsuit because he was denied 
 
92. Peters, supra note 30, at 8. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. David Freedman, The Healthcare Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 
RELIAS MEDIA (May 1, 1999), https://www.reliasmedia.com/articles/41639-the-
health-care-quality-improvement-act-of-1986. 
96. Id. 
97. Susan L. Horner, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: 
Its History, Provisions, Applications and Implications, AM. J. L. & MED. 453, 
455 (1990). 
98. Meyers v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 341 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 
2003). 
99. Mark W. Leach, Dealing With Disruptive Physicians: The Myers Cases 
and Their Progeny, 9 AM. HEALTH. L. ASS’N. 1, 1 (Oct. 2010), (http:// 
www.postschell.com/site/files/medstaffnews_oct10.pdf). According to Westlaw, 
the Myers decision has been referenced in 419 other decisions.  
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reappointment to the hospital’s medical staff over concerns 
about his disruptive conduct.100  A hospital committee 
determined that the physician displayed repeated temper 
tantrums, he refused to limit elective cases to the time period 
assigned, he attempted to interfere with the right of an 
attending physician to refer a patient to the surgeon of his 
choice, he was condescending towards women, he refused to 
speak to members of the surgical team during a procedure, and 
he demonstrated several instances of throwing a scalpel during 
an operation.101  The committee believed that this conduct could 
adversely affect the quality of patient care and so informed the 
doctor.  Dr. Meyers requested a hearing and the board appointed 
a peer review committee consisting of a retired appeals judge, an 
attorney, a bank president, an industrialist, and dentist even 
though the bylaws noted that three people from the medical staff 
should be on the committee when “feasible.”102  The committee 
met on eleven occasions and voted not to appoint Dr. Meyers to 
the staff. 
This prompted the physician to file a lawsuit in state court 
seeking an injunction forcing the hospital to reappoint him.  The 
court refused to reinstate his privileges so the doctor filed a 
different lawsuit in federal court for violating the federal 
antitrust laws and breach of the covenant of good faith.103  In 
ruling in favor of the hospital, the court noted that HCQIA was 
enacted to allow for effective peer review, motoring of 
incompetent physicians, and to offer qualified immunity from 
damages for those who participate in peer review duties.104  This 
immunity will be granted as long as the review is performed in 
the reasonable belief that the action was in furtherance of 
quality health care; after a reasonable effort to learn the facts is 
undertaken; the physician is given adequate notice and hearing 
procedures; and in the reasonable belief that the action was 
needed after a reasonable investigation.105  Compliance with 
these requirements provides a rebuttable presumption of 
immunity, thereby forcing the physician to prove that the 
 
100. Meyers, 341 F.3d at 463. 
101. Id. at 464–65. 
102. Id. at 465. 
103. Id. at 466. 
104. Id. at 467. 
105. Id. 
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hospital did not comply with the standards.106  In this matter, 
the court determined that the doctor received adequate notice of 
the hearing, and the committee only had to consist of hospital 
staff when “feasible.”  It was not possible to appoint staff 
members to the committee in this case because they were 
working too many hours and could not devote the time to a 
hearing.107 
Isaiah v. WHMS Braddock Hospital Corp. involved a 
determination by the hospital to suspend the plaintiff’s hospital 
privileges.108  The surgeon was granted conditional privileges 
upon his completion of a proctoring program.  This remedial 
action was recommended in view of several “red flags” that the 
Chair of the Department of Surgery saw in the records dealing 
with the plaintiff’s length of operations, surgical judgment, 
decision making, ability to identify anatomy, and case 
selection.109  Following an investigation, the plaintiff’s hospital 
privileges were summarily suspended based upon the hospital’s 
bylaws that allowed precautionary suspensions when “the 
activities or professional conduct of any Medical Staff Appointee 
are considered to be a departure from the standard of the 
Medical Staff or the Hospital.”110 
The Medical Events Subcommittee then convened, met with 
the plaintiff, and discussed the precautionary suspension.  The 
end result was that the Subcommittee reached the conclusion 
“that [Dr. Isaiah’s] surgical competence and clinical decision-
making is below the standards of the hospital.”111  The Medical 
Executive Committee and Board of Trustees also concluded that 
all privileges should be revoked.  The surgeon was then afforded 
a full hearing at which time the original decision was upheld and 
the National Practitioner’s Data Bank was notified of the 
action.112 
The plaintiff instituted a lawsuit on a number of grounds 
including defamation, invasion of privacy, and tortious inference 
 
106. Meyers, 341 F.3d at 467–68. 
107. Id. at 470. 
108. Isaiah v. WHMS Braddock Hosp. Corp., No. JFM 07-2197, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 57850 at *1 (D. Md. July 25, 2008).  
109. Id. 
110. Id. at *8. 
111. Id. at *12. 
112. Id. at *19. 
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with prospective advantage.113  The defense filed a motion for 
summary judgment claiming immunity under the Health Care 
Quality Improvement Act.  The physician countered that the 
defendants were not immune because he had offered adequate 
evidence for a jury to conclude that the defendants failed to act 
appropriately with respect to the prongs of the immunity 
analysis.114 
 In dismissing the claim, the court noted that the immunity 
inquiry does not mandate that the court find that the surgeon 
actually made a mistake, breached a standard of care, or put a 
patient in danger.  Rather, all that is mandated is a 
determination that the hospital possessed a reasonable 
belief that the action taken would advance the objective of 
quality health care.  Thus, an incorrect but reasonable 
determination would still be afforded immunity.115 
Sherr v. Healtheast Care System offers another example of 
how far the courts will go to protect peer review committees.116  
Sherr was a neurosurgeon who had hospital privileges at two 
related institutions.  He filed a lawsuit against the hospitals 
claiming that their in-house neurosurgeons sought his ouster as 
a competitor by defaming his medical skills and arranging a 
sham peer review process that caused his summary 
suspension.117  The facts show that the defendants have a Spine 
Council that reviews spinal care matters, and they hold monthly 
meetings to talk about problem cases.  One of the hospital’s 
physicians referred patients to neurosurgeons who were not part 
of the in-house team, including the plaintiff.  This practice 
resulted in the referring physician being berated especially 
when he referred matters to the plaintiff who they labeled “a 
hack,” “not a good surgeon,” and an “asshole.”118 
Contemporaneously, one of the hospital’s operating room 
staff, an infection prevention specialist, expressed concern about 
the plaintiff’s increased infection rates, blood loss, and redo 
procedures.  A red flag was also raised by a Spine Quality Report 
discussing Dr. Sherr’s increased rate of infection following fusion 
 
113. Id. at *20.   
114. Isaiah, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57850, at *20–21. 
115. Id. at *49–50. 
116. Sherr v. Health East Care Sys., 262 F. Supp.3d 869 (D. Minn. 2017). 
117. Id. at *1–2. 
118. Id. at *8. 
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surgery.119  This caused one of the in-house neurosurgeons to 
contact the head of surgery about the issue.  The plaintiff was 
then notified that a peer review would be undertaken at which 
time the in-house neurosurgeon provided the committee with a 
summary of the data from the Spine Quality Report which 
showed that Dr. Sherr’s infection rate was more than double 
that of the other surgeons.120  The Committee immediately 
issued a summary suspension of Dr. Sherr’s privileges out of 
concern for patient safety.  The Medical Executive Committee 
then meet to discuss the suspension, and Dr. Sherr objected to 
the inclusion of the in-house neurosurgeon’s presence on the 
Executive Committee based upon her status as a competitor.  
After deliberating, the Committee upheld the suspension.  A 
hearing was subsequently held at the request of the plaintiff 
before the Judicial Review Committee and the suspension was 
overturned.121  Nevertheless, Dr. Sherr did not seek 
reinstatement and moved to Florida where he entered into an 
employment agreement with another practice.122 
Dr. Sherr filed a lawsuit, and the defendants argued that 
their peer review activities were immune under state and 
federal law.123  The court noted that immunity applies unless the 
peer review process is motivated by malice towards the subject 
of the review.  Dr. Sherr argued that the peer review process was 
started by the in-house neurosurgeon who was a competitor and 
had a direct economic stake in the outcome.124  The court 
dismissed this argument and stated that both state and federal 
peer review statutes “contain no provision barring competitors 
from participating in professional review activities.”125  Because 
the plaintiff failed to offer evidence from which a reasonable 
juror could determine that the peer review process was 
motivated by malice, the committee was immune from a 
lawsuit.126  Interestingly, the court noted that a reviewer’s 
 
119. Id. at *9. 
120. Id. at *9–10. 
121. Id. at *20–21.  
122. Sherr, 262 F. Supp. 3d at 878. 
123. Id. at *23. 
124. Id. at *24. 
125. Id. at *27–28. 
126. Id. at *32. 
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subjective bias or bad faith is not relevant.127 
The opposite result was reached in Islami v. Covenant 
Medical Center, Inc., where the court ruled against a hospital 
because it did not believe the defendant was entitled to summary 
judgment on the basis of HCQIA immunity.128  The defendant 
failed to provide the physician with notice and hearing 
procedures as outlined in the bylaws and under the terms of the 
statute.129 
 
B. Reliance upon Bylaws and Procedures 
 
The majority of courts hold that medical staff bylaws are 
enforceable contracts between the hospital and physician.130  
These rules generally explain who can trigger an investigation 
or request remedial action.  If such an investigation uncovers 
a doctor with shortcomings, restrictive measures may be levied 
to bring about improvement in the offending conduct, including 
the suspension of a physician’s hospital privileges.131 
The courts are disposed to rule in favor of hospitals against 
lawsuits by disruptive physicians if the peer review committee 
adheres to the process set forth in the bylaws or the rules and 
 
127. Id. at *33. 
128. Islami v. Covenant Med. Ctr., 822 F. Supp. 1361 (N. D. Iowa 1992).  
129. Id. at 1377. In Rosenhek v. Windsor Regional Hospital 2010 ONCA 
13 (2007), aff’g O.J. 44856; leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada 
refused, S.C.C.A. No. 89 (2010), a court in Ontario, Canada awarded an alleged 
disruptive physician whose hospital privileges had been revoked in bad faith 
over $3 million. The court found that the hospital had revoked his privileges 
because the doctor did not “fit in.” Shantona Chaudhury, Disruptive Physician 
Behavior and Hospital Liability in Tort: Rosenhek v. Windsor Regional 
Hospital, PAPE CHAUDHURY (March 2011), https://papechaudhury.com/ 
disruptive-physician-behaviour-and-hospital-liability-in-tort-rosenhek-v-
windsor-regional-hospital/.  
130. See Lewisburg Community Hosp. v. Alfredson, 805 S.W.2d 756, 759 
(Tenn. 1991); Pariser v. Christian Health Care Sys., 816 F.2d 1248, 1251 (8th 
Cir. 1987); Posner v. Lankenau Hosp., 645 F. Supp. 1102, 1106 
(E.D.Pa.1986); Terre Haute Regional Hosp. v. El–Issa, 470 N.E.2d 1371 (Ind. 
App. 1984); Anne Arundel General Hosp. v. O’Brien, 432 A.2d 483 (1981); St. 
John’s Hosp. Med. Staff v. St. John Regional Med. Center, N.W.2d 472, 474–
75 (1976); Joseph v. Passaic Hosp. Ass’n, A.2d 18 (1958). For examples of courts 
who have found that bylaws do not constitute a contract, see Munoz v. Flower 
Hosp., 507 N.E.2d 360 (1985); Todd v. Physicians & Surgeons Comm. 
Hosp., S.E.2d 378 (1983); Stein v. Tri–City Hosp. Authority, 384 S.E.2d 430 
(1989); see also 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 16 (1991). 
131. See Yedidag v. Roswell Clinic Corp., 346 P.3d 1136 (N.M. 2015). 
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procedures.132  In fact, the immunity granted by the Health Care 
Quality Improvement Act is not dependent upon strict 
compliance with a hospital’s bylaws, although the statute does 
include a “safe harbor” provision.133  If the procedure used by a 
hospital to handle a dispute varies from the letter of its bylaws, 
the facility will still satisfy the immunity requirements if it is 
“fair to the physician under the circumstances.”134 
Leach v. Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2135 involved 
a physician who was summarily suspended after continued 
disruptive behavior.136  In turn, the plaintiff asked the Medical 
Executive Committee to lift his summary suspension.  The chief 
of staff replied that the bylaws failed to contain a review process 
once a suspension had been upheld by the Board of Directors.  
Dr. Leach, however, was informed that the hospital had a long-
standing policy that mandated a one-year moratorium before a 
physician could reapply for staff membership.137  While the 
bylaws did not mandate such a moratorium, the hospital’s 
handbook recommended reapplication after a minimum of one 
year.  This prompted the suspended physician to file the instant 
lawsuit claiming that his due process rights were violated.138 
The Court determined that the hospital reasonably adhered 
to its rules, so the plaintiff’s claim was dismissed.  While the 
hospital’s bylaws offered no guidance for reapplication after a 
summary suspension, the Committee Handbook recommended a 
one-year moratorium.  It was noted that the hospital has an 
obligation to protect patients and to guarantee their competent 
treatment.139  Therefore, the measures used by the hospital were 
reasonable.  As for the argument that the hospital’s rules and 
regulations were inadequate to protect the doctor’s 
constitutional rights, Dr. Leach’s interest in his medical 
privileges were protected because he could have practiced at 
another hospital.  There was also no evidence that the Executive 
 
132. Erwin, supra note 5. 
133. Wieters v. Roper Hosp., Inc., 58 F. App’x 40, 46 (4th Cir. 2003). 
134. Id. at 46. 
135. Leach v. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 870 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 
1989). 
136. Id. at 301. 
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Committee failed to provide him with the necessary safeguards 
to protect his interests at the hearing.140  Lastly, the hospital has 
an obligation to offer quality medical care to its patients.  If a 
doctor is disruptive or has personal issues, the heath care facility 
has an obligation to step in.  The suspension was necessary in 
this case, so the procedural safeguards to guarantee that the 
plaintiff’s constitutional rights were protected were adequate.141 
On the other hand, the need to follow the bylaws is not 
always required.  In Taylor v. Kennestone Hospital, Inc.,142 an 
anesthesiologist was accused of sexually harassing a nurse.  
During an investigation, it was learned that the physician 
demonstrated harassing conduct toward others, such as 
inappropriate gestures and remarks, offensive touching, and 
lewd suggestions.  Several staff members even said that they 
were afraid to work when the doctor was on duty.143  The plaintiff 
was confronted with these allegations, and he admitted to a 
sexual harassment problem.  Faced with possible disciplinary 
action, the doctor gave up his staff privileges, and sought 
treatment with a psychiatrist.144  The hospital continued its 
investigation and uncovered even more instances of 
inappropriate conduct.  An accommodation was worked out 
where the doctor could see patients at the hospital so long as he 
adhered to the guidelines created by his psychiatrist.  The doctor 
was warned, however, that any other inappropriate conduct, or 
his failure to adhere with his psychiatrist’s treatment plan, 
could result in “suspension, termination or restriction of his 
clinical privileges.”145  Subsequently, the physician applied for 
reinstatement, but it was determined that he had not complied 
with the plan established by the psychiatrist.  His application 
was denied, and the plaintiff requested a hearing.  The hearing 
panel recommended that the physician be reappointed to the 
medical staff for three months upon proof from the psychiatrist 
certifying compliance with the plan.146  The Board of Trustees, 
however, rejected this recommendation and denied Taylor’s 
 
140. Id. at 303. 
141. Leach, 870 F.2d at 303. 
142. Taylor v. Kennestone Hosp., Inc., 596 S.E.2d 179 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). 
143. Id. at 181. 
144. Id. at 182. 
145. Id.  
146. Id. 
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application for reappointment. 
A lawsuit was filed, and the doctor maintained that he did 
not receive proper notice of the various proceedings which 
violated the defendant’s bylaws.  The Court granted the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment based upon the 
immunity provided by HCQIA.  It noted that the statute did not 
require that hearing procedures satisfy a hospital’s bylaws in 
order for immunity to apply.  Rather, the statute merely requires 
that the procedures of the hearing be adequate and fair under 
the circumstances.147 
 
C. Disruptive Conduct as Justification for Suspension 
 
A medical facility has the obligation to make sure that 
physicians appointed to its staff satisfy particular requirements 
of professional competence and conduct, so long as there is a 
sufficient connection between those standards and 
the hospital’s duty of offering quality patient care.148  This 
standard of care has led a number of courts to determine that 
disruptive conduct by itself is proper justification for a health 
care facility’s determination to suspend or terminate a 
physician’s staff privileges.149  As noted in Mahmoodian v. 
United Hospital Center, Inc., disruptive behavior is a legitimate 
concern to a hospital in formulating medical staffing decisions.  
Nearly all courts examining the problem have, therefore, 
concluded that a hospital may adopt and enforce bylaws 
providing for the suspension or revocation of clinical privileges 
of the offending doctor, solely when such conduct may have an 
adverse impact upon the patient’s quality of care.150  This 
determination will be based upon an objective test which focuses 
on the totality of the circumstances,151 but the test does not 
mandate that the peer review decision be correct or that the 
determination actually improves the quality of care.152 
 
147. Id. at 185. 
148. Mahmoodian v. United Hosp. Center, Inc., 404 S.E.2d 750, 759 (W. 
Va. 1991). 
149. Erwin, supra note 5, at 277–78. 
150. Mahmoodian, 404 S.E. 2d at 760. 
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The caveat that the imposition of sanctions must relate to 
the patient’s quality of care is important to keep in mind.  This 
is demonstrated by Clark v. Columbia/HCA Information 
Services where the court refused to grant immunity to a hospital 
who had revoked the privileges of a psychiatrist because their 
determination was not in furtherance of quality health care.153  
Clark, a child psychiatrist, enjoyed hospital privileges at West 
Will Hospital.  This facility alleged that the plaintiff was 
engaging in “activities or professional conduct which are 
disruptive to Hospital operations” so they conducted a peer 
review.154  The board determined that Clark had engaged in 
disruptive conduct that harmed the quality of health care so he 
was suspended.  The plaintiff instituted a lawsuit against the 
hospital claiming that the hospital “conspired to commit illegal 
conduct, divert patients away from him, and improperly 
terminated his staff privilege.”155  He also asserted that his 
privileges were ended because he reported violations of medical 
standards, an action that is protected as a matter of public 
policy.156 
The Court allowed the lawsuit to proceed because the 
plaintiff had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
revocation of his hospital privileges was not premised upon a 
reasonable belief that it was in furtherance of quality health 
care.  The Court determined that his suspension related 
exclusively to the plaintiff’s reports and letters to outside doctors 
and regulatory agencies, complaining about the care and 
procedures the defendant used in its child psychiatric practice, 
the scheduling of doctors, and in-patient insurance policies.157  
The doctor’s actions constituted protected whistleblowing 
conduct which cannot be reasonably classified as limiting 
incompetent actions or protecting patients.158 
Another challenge facing the alleged disruptive physician 
who fights disciplinary action is the awarding of attorney’s fees 
to the hospital; Sternberg v. Naticoke Memorial Hospital, Inc. 
 
153. Clark v. Columbia/HCA Info. Servs. Inc., 25 P.3d 215 (Nev. 2001). 
154. Id. at 218. 
155. Id. at 219. 
156. Id. at 220–21. 
157. Id. at 222–23. 
158. Id. at 223. 
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provides an example.159  The plaintiff sued the hospital due to 
the precautionary suspension of his clinical privileges.  The facts 
demonstrated that the physician was critical of the hospital’s 
practices and was often vocal about quality of care issues.  The 
way that he articulated his opinions and dealing with the staff, 
however, was disruptive and put patients at risk.160  The 
plaintiff did not succeed on his challenge to overturn the 
suspension and he was presented with a $412,928 bill for legal 
services incurred by the hospital in defense of the lawsuit.  The 
hospital’s bylaws provided that if “an individual institutes legal 
action and does not prevail, he or she will reimburse the Hospital 
and any member of the Medical Staff named in the action for all 
costs incurred in defending such legal action, including 
reasonable attorney’s fees.”161  Sternberg asserted that the 
legislature found that an award of attorney’s fees should be 
restricted in HCQIA immunity cases to those that are frivolous, 
unreasonable, without foundation, or instituted in bad faith.162  
The court disagreed and found that the counsel fee provision 





A disruptive physician can cause havoc in the work place 
and compromise patient safety.  While the issue was once swept 
under the rug, this is no longer the case.  Troublesome conduct 
is now an area of primary concern among health care providers, 
and it is often discussed in the hospital’s bylaws or rules and 
regulations.  Offending physicians can face prompt suspension 
or revocation of their hospital privileges, a decision that has 
lasting implications. 
State and federal legislatures have recognized the need to 
protect peer review committees so they have been granted 
qualified immunity for their actions. In turn, court review of 
physician discipline is very limited and the judiciary tends to 
favor the medical organization as long as the basic tenants of 
 
159. Sternberg v. Naticoke Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 62 A.3d. 1212 (Del. 2013). 
160. Id.  
161. Id. at 1216. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 1221. 
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due process have been followed. 
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